Buffalo Law Review
Volume 51

Number 4

Article 3

10-1-2003

Comments on Warren Grimes: Transparency in Federal Antitrust
Enforcement
Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown University Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Pitofsky, Comments on Warren Grimes: Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 Buff. L.
Rev. 995 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol51/iss4/3

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 51

FALL

2003

NUMBER

4

SYMPOSIUM
Transparency in Federal Antitrust
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WARREN

S.

GRIMESt

[Tihe facts bearing on the merger are secret, including not only
facts that businessmen normally keep confidential, but also facts
readily available to the public through other sources; the law that
emerges from the commission's decision is secret; the policy the
commission declares is secret; the commission's legal analysis, if
any, is secret; the political rewards to the commission's chairman,
if any, are secret; and the commission's reasons, if any, for
conducting the public's business in secret are secret.

-Kenneth

Culp Davis'

t Senior Research Fellow, American Antitrust Institute and Professor,
Southwestern University School of Law. David Balto, Stephen Calkins, Albert
Foer, Robert Lande, Douglas Rosenthal, Stephen Ross, Robert Skitol, and
Lawrence Sullivan read an earlier draft of this paper and generously provided
comments. Thomas Eilmansberger provided helpful insights and materials on
transparency in the enforcement of EU competition law. Gabrielle HerderscheeHunter gathered useful background data and materials from the antitrust
agencies.
1. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
113-14 (1971). Professor Davis is describing the Federal Trade Commission's
non-hearing premerger clearance process as it existed in the late 1960s. See id.
at 70-74.
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INTRODUCTION

Few would dispute the importance of openness for fair,
responsive, and wise democratic government. Here, I
examine the affirmative case for transparency in the
antitrust enforcement decisions of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"). Although both agencies disclose a great deal of
information through guidelines, opinions, speeches,
testimony, and public case filings, their record in publishing
information about enforcement decisions is problematic.
The system of premerger review has changed substantially
since Professor Davis's criticism quoted above, but the
disclosure problem remains largely unresolved. Although
the FTC has recently made meaningful efforts to increase
transparency, the results at both agencies remain
unsatisfactory. Neither agency routinely provides any
explanation of its decision not to challenge a proposed
merger, even if genuine issues were raised, carefully
studied, and decided by the agency. Similarly, when agency
opposition to a proposed merger results in the would-be
participants abandoning the transaction, there is typically
no disclosure of the agency's analysis. In merger inquiries
in which the agency reaches a negotiated settlement,
agency public disclosure is often inadequate, particularly in
the case of Justice Department fix-it-first resolutions.
After an overview of the costs and benefits of
transparency in a law enforcement context, here I examine
the two agencies' disclosure policies and the consequences
of those policies. Deficiencies are not limited to merger
enforcement, but the need for transparency is perhaps most
evident in this area. Merger enforcement policy is
increasingly a matter of administrative decision (and less a
matter of judicial interpretation). Yet transparency for this
vital area is lacking. For example, during the five fiscal
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year period 1998-2002, the FTC provided minimally
adequate disclosure in only 56% of its key merger
enforcement decisions; the Antitrust Division's record was
worse, providing minimally adequate disclosure in only 21%
of its key merger decisions. This interpretation of the
agency record is generous. Even within the category of
"minimally adequate" disclosure, there was a consistent
failure to identify and explain agency analysis of "nearmiss" issues: non-trivial competitive concerns that were
nonetheless deemed insufficiently weighty to require
agency action.
The lack of meaningful disclosure can mask errors of
under enforcement or over enforcement. But the problem is
more acute with respect to under enforcement because of
the tendency of both agencies to neglect to reveal analysis
of issues for cases that are not brought or claims that are
not made. Indeed, even if the agency brings an action, the
case is usually settled by a consent in which the agency
discloses its thinking only with respect to issues that are
addressed in the remedy. This leaves the public in the dark
as to conduct deemed unlawful but not addressed in the
remedy or conduct considered borderline but not challenged
by the agency. The possibility that enforcement errors are
undiscovered is most troublesome at the Antitrust Division
because, unlike the FTC where any of five commissioners
can release a statement when there is disagreement about
an enforcement 'decision, the Antitrust Division has no
existing mechanism for disclosing agency analysis of
disputed or "near-miss" issues.
Reform of agency disclosure policies is needed, but
cannot be achieved without a commitment at the highest
level. FTC Chairman Murris has already made helpful
initial steps. The dimensions of reform must be framed with
an eye to the law of unintended consequences. A disclosure
policy that is overly broad or unduly burdensome could lead
to unnecessary costs on enforcers and targets alike, and
circumvention that leads to concealment instead of
disclosure. Congressional oversight would be helpful and
some amendments to current law may be needed.
The major recommendations offered here are:
(1) that web sites be reworked to make them more user
friendly, including the use of coordinated subject matter
indexes for each category of enforcement that allow
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seamless cross references from one agency's web site to the
other;
(2) that for all publicly traded firms, the agency issue
prompt information at each critical step of an enforcement
investigation to avoid any perception of unfair stock trading
based on leaked information;
(3) that the agencies provide meaningful explanations when
extended civil enforcement investigations are terminated,
regardless of whether the agency decides to pursue or not to
pursue enforcement action;
(4) with respect to merger enforcement, disclosure should
operate at two levels: (i) for all reported transactions the
agency should, promptly after receiving a Hart Scott Rodino
("HSR") filing, release summary information including the
identity of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and
the markets in which the parties are active; and (ii) for all
transactions for which the agency issues a second request
or for which an extended investigation is conducted, the
agency should issue a more detailed explanation if and
when it reaches a conclusion that the transaction is likely
to, or is unlikely to, violate the antitrust laws;
(5) that steps be taken to minimize unnecessary burdens or
obstacles to disclosure, including amendment of the HSR
Act to clarify an agency's authority to issue explanatory
opinions and of the Tunney Act to eliminate burdensome
requirements that do not meaningfully further the goals of
transparency; and
(6) that more meaningful and complete disclosure be made
in settled cases, including information on near-miss issues
or alternative remedies not pursued.
I. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY

A. The Goals of Transparency
"Sunlight," Justice Brandeis wrote, "is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
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policeman."2 Scholars of administrative law' and, on various
occasions, Congress have endorsed this theme.4 An
international organization now promotes transparency as a
critical deterrent to corruption in government.5 The benefits
of transparency in antitrust enforcement have also long
been recognized. Professor Turner stated in 1965 that "to
the extent that the enforcement agency, be it the
Department of Justice or the FTC, has been able to come to
a firm conclusion, there are many advantages to be gained
and little to be lost from publicizing what that position is."6
Here are five sets of interrelated goals that transparency
serves.
1. Improving Pre-Decision Process and Results.
Anticipation of a published decision creates an incentive for
refinement and diligence in the agency's fact-gathering and
deliberating process before a decision is reached. Decisionmakers who operate knowing that their analysis will be
open for all to question may exercise more diligence and
achieve sounder results. In addition, if members of the
public are informed about an agency inquiry before a
decision is made, they are more likely to come forward with
critical information or suggested analysis of the legality of
the conduct at issue. This information can assist the agency
in achieving a full and accurate understanding of the facts.
2. Fostering Agency Accountability After a Decision is
Reached. After a decision is announced, an agency
2. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).

3. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 111 (concluding that opening administrative
processes to public scrutiny would provide the best single protection against
arbitrariness).
4. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); Government in the
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
5. Transparency International was founded in 1993 and now has chapters in
many countries throughout the world. See Transparency International, at
http://www.transparency.org/about-ti/history.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
The World Bank has also stressed the importance of transparency in the
administration of bank-funded projects throughout the world. See Susan RoseAckerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE
PRIVATE SECTOR No. 75, April 1996, at 1 ("[Flighting corruption involves
introducing more competition, privatizing government activities, and
introducing greater transparency.").
6. Donald F. Turner, Address before the Antitrust Section of the American
Bar Association 6-7 (Aug. 10, 1965), in Robert D. Joffe, Guidelines-Past,Present
and Future, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 189 (1982).
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explanation of its decision fosters oversight by interested
and informed outsiders, a meaningful performance check on
the agency. This post-decisional oversight can be pivotal in
shaping future agency enforcement policy. An agency
insulated from outside scrutiny may blindly pursue
misguided or mistaken policies for a prolonged period.
3. Enhancing Knowledge of and Compliance with the
Law. Announcing an agency decision increases understanding of the agency's policy and will likely increase
voluntary compliance with that policy. If knowledge of the
law is scattered or incomplete, well-intentioned citizens
may act in ignorance of the law. An agency can also use an
announced decision in precatory fashion, suggesting the
boundaries of its decision and indicating which factors, had
they been present in greater or lesser strength, might have
produced a different result. Without this information,
attorneys may offer vague or incomplete counsel because
they lack a detailed understanding of agency policy. In
addition, if knowledge of a particular matter is confined to
agency insiders and the few outsiders who happen to have
been involved in a particular transaction, a barrier to
knowledge is created that can foster an elitist and difficultto-enter specialty within the private bar.7
4. Fostering Fairness of and Public Confidence in the
Institutions of Government. Pre-decisional transparency can
be a form of due process, allowing affected parties an
opportunity to offer submissions that can avoid unfair or
unjust results. Affected parties include not only the target
of an investigation but others enriched or injured by the
target's conduct, such as a rival, a customer, or a supplier.
Post-decisional transparency can also increase public
confidence in a government agency. If the agency has
offered cogent reasons for its decision, the public is more
likely to accept the rectitude of the policy. If the policy is
sound but ill-communicated, oversight can discipline the
agency to refine its public explanations to garner public
support. If the policy is misguided, disclosure can increase
7. See Thomas M. Jorde, Coping with the Merger Guidelines and the
Government's "Fix-it-first"Approach: A Modest Appeal for More Information, 32
ANTITRUST BULLETIN

579, 594 (1987) (The lack of information about merger

decisions "fosters 'privatization' of information in specialized law firms.").
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the public's opportunity to understand shortcomings and
work for a change.
5. Avoiding Unfair Arbitrage Activity in the Stock
Market. Law enforcement decisions change the value of an
affected firm's stock. If there is no timely public disclosure
as an investigation moves through critical phases, high
value is placed on leaked information that gives the
possessor a significant advantage in stock market trades.
Timely disclosure avoids actual or perceived unfairness in
market trading.
B. The Special Need for Transparency in Antitrust
Enforcement Decisions
As a general rule, the need for transparency increases
as an agency's actions take on a law-making role. An
individual decision to grant or deny a license or benefit may
have little impact on the underlying rules that govern an
agency's actions. More traditional law enforcement
decisions, i.e., whether or not to prosecute common criminal
conduct, usually are not explained at the time the decision
is made. This is consistent with the distinction drawn in
administrative law between law enforcement and rulemaking, the latter being subject to greater disclosure and
openness requirements. But the distinction is not a clear
one. As law enforcement decisions become common-law
markers that guide future decisions, they take on a
"rulemaking" mantel. The need for disclosure grows. A
decision becomes a vital part of the fabric of the law and
those subject to that law have a greater need for access to
the decision.
The importance of transparency in antitrust enforcement has been recognized by others. During the 1980s, the
House Judiciary Committee explored the issue in oversight
hearings and, on an experimental basis, asked the agencies
to provide additional information about merger enforcement
decisions. ° In 1989, the ABA Task Force on the Antitrust
Division recommended that the Division commence
8. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 4.2 (3d ed. 1991)
(distinguishing administrative orders from rulemaking).
9. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 113-14; Jorde, supra note 7, at 594; Turner,
supra note 6, at 189.
10. See infra Part IID.
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"generic" annual reporting of merger enforcement
decisions.11 Nothing came of this recommendation. In 2000,
the Final Report of the International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee (ICPAC) stressed the need for
transparency in merger reporting standards, albeit without
urging greater
disclosure for the substantive decisions
12
themselves.
The federal antitrust agency's treatment of merger
enforcement decisions has remained largely unchanged
since the introduction of the HSR premerger program in
1978. Today, the agencies review several thousand
corporate merger transactions every year. Most of these
reviews are perfunctory-in fiscal year 2001, almost 97% of
reported transactions were cleared without a request for
additional information."3 Individually, most clearance
decisions have relatively little disclosure value. A small
percentage of these clearances, however, may result in
careful agency scrutiny that may last for months, whether
or not the transaction is ultimately challenged. One guide
to determining the weight that an agency gives to a
particular merger investigation is whether or not the
agency has made a request for additional information ("a
second request"). In recent years, a high percentage of the
transactions in which second requests were issued have
resulted in enforcement action. 4 Agency disposition of these
investigations, whether the agency pursues enforcement or
drops the investigation, has guidance value within the
agency itself and among the cadre of specialized attorneys
who handle such merger transactions. If these decisions are
11. Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task
Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 32 (July
1989), reprinted in 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 747, 763 (1989).
12. See Final Report, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 87-163 (2000), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ipac/chapter
3.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
13. For fiscal year 2001, the percentage of premerger filings that generated
additional requests for information was 3.2%. HART ScoT RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 5 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/hsrarfy2001.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2003). For
an overview of merger enforcement since the adoption of premerger reporting,
see Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United
States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 137-142 (2002).
14. For the fiscal year 2000, enforcement actions represented over 80% of
the number of second requests filed. Leary, supra note 13, at 137. That figure
appears to have gone down slightly for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. See infra
Tables 1 and 4.
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not explained to the public, knowledge of the decision will
remain the province of the agency itself (and privileged
outsiders involved in the particular transaction).
The need for increased disclosure in merger matters is
highlighted because of the contrast between current
disclosure and the disclosure that occurred before the HSR
premerger clearance was in effect. The old system was one
that relied heavily on post-merger complaints filed by the
two agencies. Many of these cases were litigated-the
defendants usually had already consummated the merger
and were in a strong position to contest the agency's
challenge in litigation. The result was a steady flow of court
opinions that invited oversight and criticism. This oversight
probably played a significant role in steering the agencies
toward more permissive merger policies by the mid 1970s.1"
The premerger clearance process implemented in the
late 1970s fixed a reat deal of what was wrong with
merger enforcement. In particular, it gave the agencies
advance notice of a pending merger and an opportunity to
seek an injunction before the merger was consummated.
One consequence of granting the agencies this power,
however, is that it greatly decreased the incentive and
ability of merging parties to litigate an agency challenge.
Rather than endure a prolonged period of uncertainty while
a proposed merger is contested in court, most parties either
choose to negotiate with the agency to resolve competition
issues or to abandon the transaction. This has greatly
reduced the flow of judicial opinions in merger cases.
Indeed, after a quarter Century of experience with premerger clearance, we have yet to see a single substantive
Supreme Court case generated through the premerger
clearance procedure. 17 The stifled flow of judicial opinions is
a loss for transparency because the abandoned transactions
15. See Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second
Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 15-22 (1998) (explaining how

judicial decisions, even when they make bad law, attract criticism and tend to
be eroded or overturned in subsequent decisions).
16. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L.
ECON. 43 (1969) (describing inadequacies in pre-HSR government merger
enforcement).
17. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990), was a Supreme Court
case that arose after the FTC settled a merger challenge on terms unacceptable
to the State of California. The Court's opinion addressed the authority of the
State to obtain injunctive relief under the Clayton Act.
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and settlements usually do not provide disclosure
comparable to that provided by a court opinion.
For Section 7 of the Clayton Act, what was judicially
made law has now become much more administrative lawlaw that is determined by the enforcement decisions of the
two federal agencies. 8 The relative lack of disclosure for
these enforcement decisions could be addressed if the
agencies offered public statements explaining a decision in
any case likely to have a significant guidance value,
regardless of whether the agency decides to challenge the
transaction.
C. The Arguments Against Transparency
To align oneself for secrecy and against open
government is to risk ridicule, calumny, or worse. Yet, if
transparency in government is fundamental for responsive,
democratic government, it is a value that government
agencies often embrace reluctantly. An agency may resist
disclosure or seek to thwart law or regulation designed to
ensure openness. To their credit, the antitrust agencies
have attempted to offer information in a number of ways.
Agency merger guidelines are designed to provide
information about the government's approach to a merger
investigation. Successive iterations of the Guidelines have
described increasingly sophisticated modes of economic
analysis as the standard for agency inquiry. The Guidelines
by themselves are, however, not an adequate disclosure.
Even if the agency attempts to follow the Guidelines'
template for an investigation, the fact-intensive nature of
merger inquiries leaves outsiders with little indication of
why issues were resolved one way or the other or, indeed,
whether the agency even addressed a particular issue. One
consequence of the information vacuum may be that merger
counseling is becoming increasingly the province of a
handful of law firms with the benefit of inside information
gained from past dealings with the federal agencies.

18. See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing
Nature of Antitrust Enforcment, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1399 (1998) ("[O]nly a tiny
handful of transactions are ever challenged in court by either agency."); see also
Albert Foer, Toward Guidelinesfor Merger Remedies, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
211, 212 (2001) ("[A] new body of administrative law has consequently evolved
outside of the judiciary's sight.").
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Agency intransigence in the face of demands for more
disclosure can be well-grounded. If transparency is
excessive, misplaced, or poorly implemented, it can do more
harm than good. When a multi-member legislative, judicial,
or executive body must reach a decision, confidentiality
among members in the formative and negotiation stages
can be crucial for compromise and consensus. When
prosecutors are investigating potential criminal misconduct, confidentiality may be needed to prevent
obstruction or evasion, to avoid unfair adverse publicity for
the investigation target, or to lessen the risk that a
potential defendant will flee the jurisdiction. When
economic regulation of commerce is at issue, pledges of
confidentiality may greatly ease the government's task of
obtaining sensitive business information. And, of course,
secrecy costs less: at least in the short term, there is no
more efficient form of government than an autocracy
unburdened by disclosure obligations and insulated from
outside scrutiny.
Many of these concerns have reduced relevance to an
agency explanation issued after its decision is reached. For
example, the serious difficulties that could arise in any predecisional disclosure requirement that undermined the
confidentiality of internal agency discussion, or burdened
the communications between the agency and the parties
involved in an investigation, are less relevant to a
requirement that an agency explain its decision at the time
it is announced. Even post-decisional disclosure, however,
may have serious drawbacks. As previously noted,
prominently cited concerns are: (1) the burden of preparing
for a public disclosure; (2) the risk that confidential
business information would be disclosed or that the mere
threat of disclosure would make it more difficult for the
agency to obtain voluntary submissions of information; (3)
the risk that disclosure of past agency decisions may
unreasonably constrain the agency in making future
enforcement decisions; and (4) the risk that more disclosure
will politicize enforcement decisions and increase burdens
on staff.
The strongest opponent of transparency has been the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Unlike the FTC,
the Antitrust Division, with responsibility for criminal
enforcement of the Sherman Act, has operated in a lawenforcement culture. Criminal investigations may be
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conducted with the assistance of a grand jury and often are
cloaked in secrecy (of course, merger and Section 2
Sherman Act investigations typically do not involve
criminal enforcement). Some current and former Antitrust
Division officials appear to share a genuine conviction that
a law enforcement model (unburdened by the disclosure
requirements of administrative agencies) will operate more
efficiently and with less political interference. Perhaps this
culture is also influenced by the single decision-maker
model that allows information to more easily be kept inhouse (in contrast to the FTC's commission model that
necessitates the sharing of information among five decisionmakers).
Whatever the cause, some Antitrust Division officials
have in the past opposed efforts to provide more
transparency in merger enforcement decisions. One
Antitrust Division chief has argued that disclosure of the
reasons an agency did not pursue a case might directly or
indirectly reveal evidentiary difficulties which, in turn,
might make the agency "vulnerable to counsel planning
transactions that are designed to frustrate our ability to
successfully enjoin them." It has also been argued that
disclosure might reduce the flexibility of the agency in
responding to unique factual circumstances and that
meaningful transparency cannot be implemented without
violating the confidentiality guaranteed to the parties who
supply the information. ° The Clayton Act may prohibit
disclosure of information obtained in a premerger filing
except in administrative or judicial litigation, although this
construction of the statute may be unnecessarily narrow."
19. Authorization for the Antitrust Div. of the Dep't of Justice, Oversight
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 191-92 (1988) (statement of Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.).
20. See the comments of former Antitrust Division officials who registered
opposition to the generic reporting recommended by the 1989 ABA Task Force,
supra note 11, at 32 n.61.
21. The Clayton Act provides:
Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant
Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this
section shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, and
no such information or documentary material may be made public,
except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or
proceeding. Nothing in this section is intended to prevent disclosure to
either body of Congress or to any duly authorized committee or
subcommittee of the Congress.
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Objections may also be made to the costs of public
disclosure. A high level Antitrust Division official told the
author in 1986 that compliance with the Tunney Act's
requirements cost a minimum of $75,000 for each case."2
While these objections may carry some weight, none of
them seems to have prevented either agency from providing
explanatory information when it has chosen to do so.
No disclosure system is cost-free. For example, issuing
explanatory statements whenever an agency closes a major
investigation will require a commitment of agency
resources that could reduce those available for other
enforcement initiatives. With another HSR deadline
looming, and with the need to file a brief here or prevent
harm there, an agency may not want to spend time on
disclosure of a matter already decided. And it could take
significant time to determine what is protected under the
HSR process. These are valid concerns that warrant
reducing the reach and exhaustiveness of any disclosure
requirement. But agencies must issue explanatory
statements when the investigation results in a decision to
seek relief in a court-approved consent decree or through
litigation. If a thorough agency investigation results in a
decision on the merits not to challenge the conduct, there is
no evident reason why this decision should have less
guidance value to those who seek to understand the
agency's actions. 3
Nor is it clear that injury to persons interested in the
enforcement decision is greater when an agency decides to
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (2000). The phrase "administrative or judicial
action or proceeding" can be read narrowly to permit disclosure only in the case
of litigation before an administrative or judicial tribunal. But "administrative
action" might reasonably be read as any action the agency takes in closing an
investigation, even if no judicial or administrative complaint is filed. Under this
broader construction, an agency would be free to release information deemed

necessary to explain its disposition of an investigation.
22. The conversation was on the occasion of a hearing before the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommitte on Monopolies and Commercial Law (at
the time I served as Subcommittee Counsel).
23. As FTC Bureau of Competition Director Joseph Simons puts it,
"explaining why the Commission decides not to take action in a particular case
may well provide at least as much useful information as an explanation of why
the Commission decides to take action in other cases." Joseph J. Simons,
Merger Enforcement at the FTC, Remarks delivered at the Tenth Annual
Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Institute (Oct. 24, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/021024/mergerenforcement.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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bring an action than when it decides to drop an
investigation. Those harmed by conduct subject to an
antitrust investigation have a tangible interest in
enforcement that could be as strong or stronger than the
target firm's interest in avoiding enforcement.
A second cost to public disclosure of an agency
enforcement decision would be the potential undermining of
the confidentiality of business information. Information
gathered in an antitrust investigation may include
confidential business data. Businesses, whether or not they
are the targets of an investigation, will be less willing to
cooperate with an enforcement agency if they fear
information submitted will be released to the public.
Indeed, the statute that provides for premerger reporting
may require that the information contained in the
submission to the agency be kept confidential.24 Thus, any
public explanation of an agency's action would have to
sidestep legal confidentiality requirements and, to the
extent confidentiality is not required, should represent a
sound compromise of the need for business secrecy with the
need for public disclosure. That these compromises can be
struck is suggested by post disclosure statements issued by
the agencies themselves and by similar statements issued
by regulatory agencies involved in competition investigations in the U.S. or abroad. 5
Would the release of agency explanations for a decision
not to pursue enforcement be a precedent that would
undermine agency discretion in pursuing enforcement in
future cases? In the baby food merger case involving a
combination of the second and third largest firms in a
market with only three significant competitors, the parties
defended their merger on the ground that the combined
firm, still significantly smaller than the number one firm,
would be a more effective competitor. The FTC won a
preliminary injunction, arguing in part that the courts had
never recognized
a "stronger-number-two-competitor"
defense. Suppose that the agency itself had previously
cleared a merger of the second and third largest firms in a
three-firm industry. Would the FTC's case have been placed
in jeopardy because the baby food firms could cite this
24. See sources cited supra note 21.
25. See infra Parts III.A-B.
26. FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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previous clearance? This should not be a major risk if the
agency statement explains the basis of its decision not to
challenge the first merger and further indicates that its
decision is limited to the narrow facts before it. Indeed, the
Commission might use the occasion of its clearance opinion
to explain under what differing circumstances a
combination of the second and third largest firms would be
challenged. The FTC issued a disclaimer in its Cruise
Mergers statement, explaining that its decision not to
challenge either of two alternative proposed acquisitions of
Princess Cruise Lines should not be read as a green-light
for mergers in high concentration industries. Attorneys
will be free to cite no-action decisions in arguing against
agency action in future cases, but that surely occurs
already, even when agency decisions are not published. One
problem with the current policy not to explain key decisions
to drop an investigation is that knowledge of these decisions
may be limited to a privileged few.
What about a case in which an agency chooses not to
pursue enforcement, not because the conduct is deemed
lawful or harmless, but because, after weighing how to
employ limited enforcement resources, the agency
determines that other cases should have priority? Or what
about a case in which the agency determines that staff
mistakes have badly compromised its case and, therefore,
undermined its chances of success in a litigated proceeding?
Would disclosure of these underlying reasons serve the
agency and public interest?
Many decisions to drop an investigation may be a "mix:"
the case is not very strong; the agency is overcommitted;
the case may make bad law; one commissioner thinks the
efficiency defense is strong; the discovery did not produce
strong evidence; etc. In these cases, the agency should not
have to announce a definitive decision when none was
made. No agency can pursue all of the unlawful conduct
that it confronts. Without embarrassment, an agency could
explain that it is dropping an investigation for administrative reasons with no determination whether the conduct
is lawful or unlawful. Staff mistakes need not be publicly
27. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd./P&O Princess
Cruises plc and Carnival
Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises plc., F.T.C. File No. 021 0041 (Oct. 4, 2002),
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/cruisestatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2003).
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disclosed (such disclosure might undermine training and
morale of staff), but the public has an interest in knowing
whether or not investigated conduct was determined to be
lawful, or merely not a proper focus for enforcement at the
time the agency reached its decision.
D. The House JudiciaryCommittee and Merger Enforcement
Transparency (1986-1988)
The House Judiciary Committee made a substantial
effort to obtain and disseminate data on merger
enforcement during the period 1986-1988.28 Chairman Peter
Rodino (who also chaired the Subcommittee on Monopolies
and Commercial Law) wrote to the Antitrust Division and
the FTC seeking comprehensive data not only on merger
cases that resulted in enforcement action, but also on
investigations that were subject to second requests but
were terminated without enforcement action.
The Committee gathered substantial information that
was not available to the public and, in 1988, published in
aggregate form statistics derived from the two agencies
merger enforcement during the years 1982-1987. Perhaps
the most significant previously undisclosed information
that came out of these statistics was that the two agencies
were (with one exception) not challenging acquisitions in
which the post-acquisition Herfendahl-Hirschman Index in
the market of highest concentration 29 was less than 1800.
During the five years in question, out of fifty-one cases in
which either agency either filed a complaint or, by
indicating its serious concerns, prompted the parties to
abandon or restructure the transaction, only a single case
involved a market of highest concentration with a postmerger HHI of less than 1800. Only two cases were in the
1800-2000 range. 0
The Committee also obtained from the Antitrust
Division HHI numbers for certain transactions subject to a
28. I served as Counsel for the Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, House Committee on the Judiciary, from 1980 to 1988.

29. Some of the transactions involved multiple markets. The Committee
used only the market of highest concentration in this measure of enforcement
initiatives. See House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commerical Law,
Federal Merger Enforcement (1979-1987), reprinted in 54 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. 476, 477 (1988).
30. See id.
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second request, but not subject to further agency
enforcement action. Although the Division described the
relevant market, it did not name the parties to the
transaction. Unfortunately, the process of parsing and
determining how best to disseminate this data was left
unresolved with the change in Committee leadership in
1989."' The Committee's efforts and the agency response to
these efforts, however, suggest the feasibility of reporting
information, including identifying the relevant markets and
providing HHI numbers, on closed investigations that were
subject to second requests. 2

II.

CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE IN DISCLOSURE OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS

Law enforcement agencies do not, as a matter of course,
release information about investigations that do not bear
fruit or do not result in law enforcement action. That
pattern, however, does not apply to investigations of
possible anticompetitive conduct by some federal agencies
and by competition law agencies outside the United States.
Anticompetitive conduct, where it exists, usually has a
market wide-impact and may affect rivals, customers, and
suppliers. To see how disclosure issues involving
investigations of anticompetitive conduct are dealt with
here and abroad, this section looks at three Federal
agencies and at the European Union. It then describes
current disclosure practices at the Antitrust Division and
the FTC.
A. Merger Enforcement Transparencyin Non-Antitrust
FederalAgencies
Transparency appears to be a matter of course for a
number of federal agencies that make decisions regarding
mergers. The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) routinely issue
opinions when they pass on a merger within their
31. Chairman Rodino did not run for reelection in 1988 and Congressman
Jack Brooks assumed the Chair of the Judiciary Committee in January of 1989.
32. The agencies have clear authority to release HSR information to
Congress, but may lack such authority for a general release of information to
the public. See sources cited supra note 21.
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regulatory jurisdiction. An example of an agency that
makes efficient disclosure of a notified acquisition and of
the agency decision is The Federal Reserve Board. The
Board invites public comments on applications for bank
mergers,33 occasionally holds public hearings before
reaching a decision, and publishes the orders disposing of
all applications.34
The FCC has jurisdiction to review mergers involving
communications firms. It reviewed, for example, the merger
of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX, approving that merger subject
to conditions in 1997."5 The FCC has concurrent jurisdiction
(with the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission) to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act but
chose to review the NYNEX merger under the broader
public interest standard of the 1934 Communications Act.36
The communications agency issued a lengthy opinion, using
the DOJ/FTC 1992 Merger Guidelines as the framework for
its analysis of competition issues. The FCC concluded that
the applicants had failed to carry their burden of
establishing that the proposed transaction was in the public
interest. Thus, the FCC's approval was contingent on the
parties' agreement to commitments that would promote
entry and provide procompetitive benefits offsetting the
likely negative effects of the merger.
FERC is another federal agency that provides detailed
opinions in its review of mergers under its jurisdiction. For
example, in 2002, FERC issued a twenty-one page opinion
explaining its decision to clear (subject to conditions) the
Ameren Corporation's acquisition of two other electric

33. Notice of Formations and Mergers of, and Acquisitions by, Bank Holding
Companies, Change in Bank Control, Federal Reserve Release, 68 Fed. Reg.
53,740 (Sept. 12, 2003), availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h2a/
h2a.cfm?view=pubs (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
34. Federal Reserve orders disposing of applications to make an acquisition
are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders.
35. See In re NYNEX Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 20,097 (Aug. 14, 1997); see
also infra Part IV (discussing the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger).
36. The Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§
214(a), 310(d) (1994)).
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power generation firms.37 Significantly, FERC will issue an
opinion even if it clears a merger without any conditions. 8
The model provided by regulatory agencies such as the
Federal Reserve, FCC, or FERC will not easily fit the
antitrust enforcement scheme. Such agencies have
relatively narrow regulatory jurisdiction with relatively few
merger cases to review. A merger review proceeding under
Section 203 of the Federal Power Act 9 has a formality and
structure (contemplating interventions by interested third
parties) that is lacking in the negative clearance model for
antitrust law merger enforcement. In a FERC proceeding,
third parties may intervene to obtain tactical advantage or
gain leverage to extract concessions from the agency or the
merging parties. ° Specialized regulatory agencies may also
have substantial leverage over industry participants when
reviewing a merger. In contrast, the antitrust agencies may
depend more on voluntary cooperation, cooperation that
might be undermined if firms were concerned that confidential business data would be leaked. But confidentiality must
be a concern of any agency that reviews proposed mergers
and should not be an excuse to withhold information useful
to the public. The models provided by the Federal Reserve,
FCC, and FERC are evidence that concerns with
confidentiality and agency flexibility need not preclude a
useful and informative statement explaining how an agency
has resolved major issues before it.
B. Merger Enforcement Transparencyin European Union
Decisions
Outside the United States, one can look to transparency
models in the competition law of other nations. In the
United Kingdom, for example, decisions of Competition
37. Ameren Servs. Co. ex rel. Ameren's Pub. Util. Subsidiaries, 101 F.E.R.C.
61,202 (Nov. 21, 2002); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 90 F.E.R.C.
61,242

(2000).
38. See, e.g., N. States Power Co., 90 F.E.R.C.
61,028 (2000) (reviewing
potential competition issues involved in the merger but concluding that no
harm to competition is likely).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1994).
40. This formal tactical maneuvering is absent from Hart Scott Rodino
premerger clearances. On the other hand, it is apparent that informal
interventions and submissions, or even public relations battles designed to
influence the agency, do occur with respect to premerger clearances before the
FTC and the Antitrust Division.
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Commission tend to be lengthy public documents with
detailed analysis and multiple appendices containing
factual data. These decisions are issued whether the
Commission finds a violation or no violation of the British
competition law.4 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt
makes efficient use of its web site to provide an up-to-date
data base of all pending mergers that have been reported to
the agency.4" The data base includes the names of the
parties to the transaction, the likely product markets
involved, and information about how to contact the staff
that are reviewing the transaction. According to one
commentator, this immediate notification of pending
mergers "will facilitate the participation of interested third
parties" at an early stage of agency review of the
transaction.43
Perhaps the most influential disclosure model outside
the United States is the competition law of the European
Union ("EU"). For those accustomed to the relative lack of
meaningful information provided by the U.S. enforcement
agencies, the practice of the European Communities ("EC")
provides a striking contrast. Transparency is a fundamental principle governing the actions of the European
Commission. Article 253 of the EC Treaty requires that the
Commission state the reasons for which its acts are based.
Article 254 of the Treaty requires that regulations,
directives and decisions of the Commission be published.
These tenets of transparency are echoed in the European
Commission's Merger Regulation.44
The European Commission's web site" systematically
lists all notified transactions, disclosing the lines of.
business in which participating firms are active, and
41. See, e.g.,

COMPETITION COMMISSION, P&O PRINCESS CRUISES

PLC

AND

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD: A REPORT ON THE PROPOSED MERGER, 2002, at

115 (issuing an opinion of 115 pages, not including the extensive appendices, in
the merger investigation of Royal Caribbean Cruises' proposed acquisition of
the P&O Princess).
42. Available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/neuanmeldungen.html.
43. Horst Henschen, Update, Germany-German Federal Cartel Office
Changes Publication Rules for Merger Transactions, 4 ABA INT'L ANTITRUST
BULL., Fall/Winter 2001, at 52, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/
committees/international/fallwinter0l.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
44. See Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, arts. 6-7, 11, amended by Council Regulation 1310/97,
1997 O.J. (L 180) 4-5.
45. Available at http://www.europa.eu.int/commcompetition/indexen.html.
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reports the Commission's dispositions of each of the notified
transactions. Even transactions that are cleared summarily
under Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation are the
subject of a Commission statement that identifies the
parties, the nature of the transaction (joint venture,
acquisition of stock, etc.), the relevant product and geographic markets, the degree of overlap of the participating
firms, and other salient facts that led the Commission to
conclude that no challenge was necessary.46 This is a
substantial disclosure undertaking. For the year 2002, the
European Commission published 240 clearance decisions
under Article 6(1)(b). During the same year, an additional
ten clearance decisions involved commitments by the
merging firms.47
As is the case with U.S. merger enforcement, only a
small percentage of reported transactions result in an
extended investigation. In 2002, the EU Commission issued
cases involving extended
final decisions in ten
investigations under Article 6(1)(c). For these transactions,
the obligatory Commission statement is likely to be much
more detailed. The statement is required regardless of
whether the Commission determines to challenge the
merger, to allow it to proceed with conditions, or to allow it
to proceed unconditionally.48 The statement must be
published, albeit provisions are made to maintain business
secrets of firms that have supplied information.
In its 2002 opinion explaining its decision not to
challenge a proposed acquisition in the cruise line industry,
the EU Commission issued a fifty-seven page statement
that contains extensive discussion and references to
economic analyses and other materials submitted by the
parties. 9 Part of this length can be attributed to the need to
assess the proposed acquisition in various geographic
46. For an example of Article 6(1)(b) clearance, see Case COMP/M.2048,
Alcatel/Thomson Multimedia JV (Oct. 26, 2000) (citing a Commission statement
that explains its decision not to challenge the joint venture at issue), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2048_en.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
47. The statistics for the European Commission are available at
(last visited
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/stats.html
Sept. 20, 2003).
48. See Council Regulation 4064/89, supra note 44, arts. 6(1)(c), 8, 20.
49. Case COMP/M.2706, Carnival Corp./P&O Princess (July 24, 2002),
availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/
m2706_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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markets (the UK, Germany, and the three Mediterranean
nations markets). A better gauge of thoroughness would be
the opinion's treatment of whether the product market
should be limited to cruises (or broadened to include other
vacation options). The opinion devotes eleven pages of
analysis to this topic and includes charts and other data
provided by the parties or their economic consulting firms.
This information could be useful in fostering a more
nuanced understanding of the law and in providing a
platform for oversight of the EU Commission's decisions.
The European Commission's Carnival decision contains
a number of references to deleted data, suggesting that the
statement may have been a redacted version of the draft
opinion circulated by the Competition Directorate to the
Commission before the Commission reached its decision.
The thoroughness of the Commission's statement tends to
refute concerns that a detailed statement would intolerably
compromise agency flexibility or business secrecy.
C. Transparencyat The Federal Trade Commission and The
Antitrust Division
Once a federal antitrust agency commits to a
meaningful investigation of past or anticipated conduct of a
firm, three outcomes are possible: (1) the investigation may
be dropped unconditionally, usually before any litigation is
initiated (in premerger investigations, the investigation
may be dropped even if the agency finds the proposed
merger to be unlawful when, in anticipation of agency
enforcement, the parties abandon the proposed merger);' °
(2) the investigation may result in a settlement, reached
either before or after litigation is commenced, in which the
target firm agrees to the imposition of a remedy; or (3) the
investigation may result in litigation and a tribunalimposed resolution of that litigation.
Because of the relative openness of judicial or
administrative litigation and the likelihood that a tribunal
decision will be accompanied by an explanatory opinion,
transparency has not been a major issue for cases resolved

50. On occasion, an agency will drop a case after litigation has been
commenced. A well-known example is the Antitrust Division's 1982 decision to
drop its case against IBM after a decade of litigation in the Southern District of
New York.
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by a court or administrative tribunal. 1 Some transparency
is provided in settled cases in which the terms are stated in
an administrative or judicial decree. On the other hand,
there appears to be little or no disclosure when a federal
antitrust agency drops an investigation, when a planned
merger is abandoned by the parties, or when the Justice
Department reaches a "fix-it-first" restructuring resolution
of a proposed merger.
1. Standards Governing Consent Settlements. For the
federal antitrust agencies, the only firm standards
governing disclosure of law enforcement decisions are those
governing consent resolutions of administrative or judicial
cases that have been filed. These standards are described
below.
a. Justice Department Settlements Under the Tunney
Act. Cases settled by the Justice Department are governed
by the terms of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
(Tunney Act)." This legislation was a 1974 congressional
response to charges that the Justice Department, yielding
to political pressure from the White House, had granted
ITT a sweetheart settlement to a suit challenging ITT's
acquisition of three companies. To discourage such political
settlements, the Tunney Act requires that a proposed
settlement be published in the Federal Register, together
with a Justice Department "competitive impact" statement
that describes the underlying proceeding and other
information, including a "description and evaluation of
alternatives" to the consent proposal actually considered by
the United States. 3 This proposal is then open to public
comment for a sixty-day period, at the close of which the
comments and the Department of Justice's reply to the
comments must also be published in the Federal Register.54
51. See Calkins, supra note 15, at 15-21 (explaining why judicial opinions
provide an excellent platform for criticism that leads to overturning or
weakening ill-considered holdings).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b). The Tunney Act also requires publication of a list of
documents upon which the Department relied and disclosure by the defendant
of all relevant contacts between the defendant and officers or employees of the
United States (other than contacts between the Justice Department and counsel
of record). 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b), (g).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d).
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Summaries of this material must be published in
newspapers of general circulation for seven days over a two
week period." After receiving all of the submissions, the
district judge is instructed to approve the judgment if its
entry is "in the public interest." The Tunney Act does not
spell out how the court is to proceed if it declines to accept
the settlement. The litigated cases suggest that a judge who
is reluctant to approve a decree wields a fair amount of
leverage to press for changes in the decree and may allow
for a continuation of the litigation (perhaps substituting
other persons to prosecute in lieu of the Department of
Justice).57
The Tunney Act remains controversial. There is now a
considerable body of precedent applying the Act, some of it
supporting a more activist judicial role, 8 and some
supporting more limited judicial involvement. 9 Not surprisingly, the Justice Department, which has on occasion
sought to evade application of the Act altogether,6 ° argues
for a limited judicial role consistent with a court's
traditional but bounded equity powers to intervene to
prevent an unjust outcome." Viewed in this way, the
Tunney Act does precious little (other than mandating a
sixty-day comment period) to alter pre-existing judicial
55. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e). The Act indicates that the court, in determining
whether a proposed decree is in the public interest, may consider various
factors, including "the competitive impact of such judgment" and "the impact of
entry of such judgment upon the public generally and on individuals alleging
specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint." Id.
57. See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust
Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10-36 (1966) (reviewing the history of Tunney Act litigation).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass.
1975). See also United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
(representing the high water mark for aggressive interpretation of judicial
powers under the Tunney Act, affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). That case no longer states the prevailing law in the D.C.
Circuit. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
59. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the court should interfere with a consent decree only if it
"appears to make a mockery of judicial power").
60. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 57, at 20-21 (describing the Justice
Department's maneuvering to try to avoid application of the Tunney Act).
61. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff, United States v. Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo., 272 F. Supp. 2d (D.C. Cir. 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f11900/11901.htm (citing cases that construe the Tunney Act narrowly).
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powers. An interpretation of the Tunney Act that envisions
a more activist role for the court might more effectively
constrain politicized sweetheart settlements, but it might
also run amuck of the constitutionally based separation of
powers principle by transferring prosecution powers to the
Judiciary.
A serious concern with the Tunney Act is the Justice
Department's consistent practice of disclosing its analysis
only of competitive issues that are addressed in the consent
decree and failing to provide meaningful analysis of
alternative remedies that were considered. The competitive
impact statements apparently are drafted after the parties
have reached agreement on a consent order and are
confined to the issues addressed in that order.63 Parties that
have provided comments on Tunney Act settlements64 or
have openly challenged such settlements65 have consistently
pointed out the Government's failure to address issues
beyond those addressed in the settlement and to provide
meaningful analysis of alternative remedies considered by
the Government. Although the courts may be reluctant to
62. See Anderson, supra note 57, at 24, 32 (reviewing the constitutional
arguments).
63. Former FTC General Counsel Stephen Calkins has described the
inadequate disclosure surrounding consent orders in these words:
Complaints accompanying orders set forth some facts, but rarely with
the thoroughness and impartiality of a good judge issuing a published
opinion. Government staff commentary accompanying consent orders
explain the rationale of the decision to settle, but rarely with the kind
of candor and comprehensiveness that one would expect of a judicial
opinion. At best, outsiders gain an understanding of agency views of an
issue in situations where potential defendants have been willing to
acquiesce in an agreement for some undisclosed mix of reasons.
Calkins, supra note 15, at 18 (citation omitted).
64. See, e.g., infra Part LV.C. (discussing Professor Carstensen's comments
on the Justice Department's settlement of the Archer Daniels Midland
acquisition of Minnesota Corn Processors).
65. See the Brief written by Kenneth W. Starr and Robert H. Bork,
challenging the Government's settlement of the Microsoft case: Brief of
Appellants Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) and
Software and Information Industry Association (SIIA) in The Computer and
Communications Industry Association v. United States, No. 03-5030, at 51
(D.C. Cir., May 5, 2003), available at http://www.ccianet.org/legalIms/brief_0505
03.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (arguing that the "independent 'public
interest' determination contemplated by the [Tunney] Act would be meaningless
if, by failing to comply with the statute's disclosure requirements, parties could
deprive courts and the public of the information they need to engage in
informed review of a decree's antitrust relief').
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enforce the Act's disclosure requirements, the Department's
narrow disclosure cannot be reconciled with the wording of
the statute. A competitive analysis is incomplete if it
addresses only competition issues for which the
Department was able to negotiate relief in the consent
order. If the Department were free to ignore genuine
competition issues not addressed in the order, even the
most egregious sweetheart settlement could be packaged in
a manner that reduced public scrutiny of critical issues.
Because the Tunney Act expressly requires a "description
and evaluation" of alternative remedies, the Department's
failure to provide this analysis is difficult to defend.
Another fundamental deficiency in the Tunney Act is
that it does absolutely nothing to prevent political bias or
errors in judgment that result in an enforcement action not
being brought. If antitrust enforcement is susceptible to
political influence (which to some degree it surely is), one
would expect this problem to be evidenced at least as often
in the dropping of an investigation as in the settlement of
ongoing litigation. In the long term, the public interest
might be well served by cutting back burdensome or
tenuous requirements of the Tunney Act and adopting a
broader provision that requires a published agency
explanation each time a substantial investigation is
dropped or a case is settled. These provisions would not
prevent, just as the Tunney Act does not prevent, politically
tainted agency action, but they would open any important
enforcement decision to informed public scrutiny, and do so
without raising separation of powers issues. In the long
term, this disclosure
should provide
for better
accountability for the agency's actions.
b. FTC Consent Settlements in Competition Cases. FTC
cases settled by consent are governed by Part 2 of that
agency's rules." Commission consent orders, once initially
approved by the Commission, are placed on the public
record for thirty days to allow for comments. Also published
is a Commission explanation of the proposed consent
order.67 After termination of the comment period, the
Commission may issue the order, modify it, or withdraw it

66. 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-2.34 (2003).
67. 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c).

964

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

for further proceedings.68 These rules governing consent
orders are less rigorous than the Tunney Act procedures.
There is, for example, no provision for a court or other
outside body to review the order under a public interest
standard. There is no requirement for disclosure of any FTC
reply to comments, no requirement for publication of the
proposed consent agreement in newspapers of general
circulation, nor is there an opportunity for an outside
tribunal to continue the proceeding against the wishes of
the Commission majority.
Why do the FTC and the Justice Department operate
under different standards for entry of a consent settlement?
The FTC, unlike the Justice Department, functions not only
as an investigating and prosecuting agency, but also as an
administrative tribunal. Any decision by the Commission
must be approved by a majority of the FTC's five members,
only three of whom can be members of the same political
party. A biased sweetheart settlement is unlikely to escape
the attention of all five Commission members, any one of
whom can respond by filing a dissenting statement that will
bring the matter to the attention of the public.
Placing these differences to one side, each agency has
similar problems in dealing with settlements: One such
problem is how to deal with important antitrust issues that
are not directly addressed in the settlement. Here, the FTC,
just as the Antitrust Division, tends to disclose only those
issues addressed in the settlement, leaving the public
uninformed as to its thinking on other genuine competition
issues raised by the investigation.69
2. FTC Antitrust Enforcement Transparency. Table 1
below shows the FTC's merger enforcement activity during
the five fiscal year period 1998-2002. Throughout this
analysis, second requests are used as a measure of the
number of substantial premerger investigations conducted
by the agency. Under the HSR Act, second requests are a
demand for additional documentation that is typically
issued when the investigating agency believes that further
information is required to address serious competitive
issues that may be raised by a planned acquisition (or that
further information is required to support the agency's
68. 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(e).
69. See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion of settled cases.
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preliminary conclusion that the transaction would violate
the law). In the past few years, well over 50% of second
requests have led to enforcement action by the agency."
This measure is subject to error because a substantial
merger investigation could occur without a second request
being filed. Nonetheless, this is the best available indicator
that the agency regards a particular transaction as
appropriate for something more than a perfunctory inquiry.
As Table 1 shows, of the 188 FTC investigations
involving second requests during the five year period, an
estimated 44 were dropped by the agency, 39 others were
dropped after the parties abandoned the acquisition
(perhaps because of expressed agency misgivings about the
transaction), 87 resulted in consent orders that imposed
restructuring or other conditions on the transaction, and 18
were litigated through the filing of an administrative
complaint (and often also in a preliminary injunction
proceeding in a federal district court).
Table 1
HSR Merger Enforcement
Federal Trade Commission
FY 1998 - FY 2002
Full Phase
Investigations

Second
Requests

FY 1998
FY 1999
FY 2000
FY 2001
FY 2002

56
47
53
42
41

46
45
43
27
27

Totals

239

188

Est.
Dropped
Investiga-

'Abandoned
Mergers

Consent1
Resolutions

Litigated
Cases

12
15
11
3
3

7
12
9
4
7

23
18
18
18
10

4
0
5
2
7

44

39

87

18

tions

Table 2 shows the relative percentage of these cases in
which no disclosure or inadequate disclosure was made.
The table includes under the category of no disclosure or
inadequate disclosure the following dispositions: (1) when
the FTC drops a merger investigation that was subject to a
70. See Leary, supra note 13, at 137.
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second request; and (2) when the parties to a proposed
acquisition abandon the transaction in the face of agency
opposition. During the five fiscal year period (1998-2002),
44% of all dispositions of significant merger investigations
occurred under conditions of inadequate or no disclosure.
When investigations are dropped because the parties
abandon the proposed merger in the face of FTC opposition,
there is typically no meaningful disclosure. However, when
the agency decides to drop an investigation because it
determines that there would be no Section 7 violation, the
Commission has increasingly offered some disclosure.
During the three fiscal years 2000-2002 when a merger
investigation subject to a second request was dropped, one
or more commissioners issued an explanatory statement on
six occasions; 71 on one other occasion, the Commission
issued a brief press release. 2 In many of these cases,
disclosure may have been provoked by disagreement among
the commissioners. Thus, with respect to PepsiCo's
acquisition of the Gatorade brand from Quaker Oats and
with respect to General Mills' acquisition of Pillsbury, the
Commission dropped the investigation in the face of a 2-2
split over whether to take enforcement action. As described
in Part IV.A. below, the disclosure provided was
inadequate. Statements tended to address only the issues
on which the Commissioners disagreed and did not provide
a full picture of the underlying facts or the competition
issues at stake.

71. See Synopsys Inc./Avanti Corp., F.T.C. File No. 021-0049 (Statements of
3 Commissioners, July 26, 2002) at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/avant.htm;
Hewlett-Packard Inc./Compaq Computer Corp., F.T.C. File No. 011-0249
(Statement of 1 Commissioner, Mar. 2002), at http://www3.ftc.gov/os/2002/03/
hpthompson.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003); Corp. General Mills, Inc./Diageo
plc/Pillsbury Co., F.T.C. File No. 001-0213 (Statements of 3 commissioners, Oct.
2001), at http://www3.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0010213.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2003); Phillips Corp./Tosco Corp., F.T.C. File No. 011-0095 (Statement of the
Commission, Sept. 18, 2001), at http://www3.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0110095.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003); Amerisource Health Corp./Bergen Brunswick
Corp., F.T.C. File No. 011-0122 (Statement of the Commission and one
individual commissioner's statement, Aug. 24, 2001), at http://www3.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0010122.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003); PepsiCo, Inc./Quaker Oats
Co., F.T.C. File No. 011-0059 (2 statements, each signed by 2 commissioners,
Aug. 2001), at http://www3.ftc.gov/os/2001/08/anthonythompsonpepsistatement.
htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
72. See Covisint, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 001-0127 (Sept. 11, 2000), at
http://www3.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0010127.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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Table 2
FTC Merger Enforcement Transparency
FY 1998 - FY 2002
FY 1999

FY 1998

FY 2000

D

FY 2001

FY2002

Inadequate Disclosure: Investigation Dropped or Merger Abandoned
Minimal Disclosure: Consent Resolution or Litigation

The most complete disclosure of reasons for dropping a
merger investigation probably occurred in the October 2002
Commission and dissenting statements for the cruise
merger investigation. 3 Apparently the issuance of the
cruise merger statements, while perhaps reflecting a trend
toward greater openness, does not indicate any basic
change in FTC disclosure policy. 4
The category of minimally adequate disclosure includes
cases in which there was a consent decree entered or cases
that were litigated through issuance of an administrative
complaint (and often in a preliminary injunction proceeding). Over the five fiscal year period, 56% of the
significant premerger investigations resulted in minimally
adequate disclosure of the Commission's analysis. Most of
these cases (87 of the 104 investigations in this category)
were consent settlements. As described in Part IV below,
73. The Cruise Mergers statements were issued in fiscal year 2003 and are
not tabulated in Table 2. The statements and supplementary material released
by the Commission are cited in note 88, infra.
74. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the Cruise Mergers Statements).
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consent resolutions usually result in substantial disclosure,
but the information is typically based solely on the issues
addressed in the proposed settlement.
Non-merger antitrust enforcement occupies a smaller
block of the Federal Trade Commission's competition law
resources. During the five-year fiscal period (1998-2002),
Table 3 shows that 58 full phase non-merger investigations
resulted in seven litigated cases (either by an administrative complaint or federal court complaint for a
permanent injunction) and 31 cases settled by consent.
Most of the full phase investigations opened by the Bureau
of Competition presumably would have raised significant
antitrust issues. Although it is difficult to obtain an
accurate sense of the transparency problem, subtracting the
38 cases from the 55 full phase investigations, it appears
that roughly 17 full phase investigations were dropped
during the five-fiscal-year period. The Commissioners
issued statements explaining their decision to terminate
the Western States Gasoline investigation in May of 2001,"M
but this result was an exception. There was no systematic
or full disclosure of the reasons that the remainder of these
investigations were terminated. For the cases resolved by
consent, the disclosure problem (as with consents in merger
cases) again lies in the failure to describe and analyze
genuine competition issues that were not addressed in the
consent order.

75. See Western States Gasoline Investigation, F.T.C. File No. 981-0187
(Statement of Commissioners Anthony, Swindle and Leary, separate statement
of Commissioner Thompson, May 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/wsgpi
swindle.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).

2003]

FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

969

Table 3
Non-Merger Enforcement
Federal Trade Commission
FY1998- FY 200

FY
FY
FY
FY
FY

1998
1999
2000
200f
2002

Totals

Full Phase
Investigations
14
11
6
10
17

Consent
Resolutions
10
4
8
1
8

Litigated
Cases
2
1
1
2

58

31

7

3. Justice Department Antitrust Civil Enforcement

Transparency. In comparison to the FTC, the Justice
Department has been notably less forthcoming in providing
information about antitrust enforcement decisions. The
comparisons drawn here involve only merger and other civil
antitrust enforcement. Criminal enforcement is addressed
separately in a subsequent section.
Table 4 below shows the overall HSR enforcement
activity for the Antitrust Division during the five fiscal year
period 1998-2002. As was the case with the FTC, the data
uses the number of second requests as a basis for
computing the number of substantial premerger
investigations that were dropped by the agency. The
Department compiles a list of investigations in premerger
review that is significantly larger than the number of
second requests. For example, during the five fiscal year
period, the Department reports opening 670 HSR
investigations, yet only 290 of these (or 43%) resulted in the
Department issuing a second request. Most of these
investigations are likely to have involved substantial
antitrust issues for which an explanation of the agency
decision could have provided significant guidance.
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Table 4
HSR Merger Enforcement Transparency
Department of JuStice
FY 1998 - FY 2002

FY
1998
FY
1999
FY
2000
FY
2001
FY
2002
Totals

Initiated
Investigations

Second
Requests

176

Abandoned
Mergers

102

Est.
Dropped
Investigations
51

175

68

137

Tunney
Consents

Litigated
Cases

17

Fix It
First
Resolution
24

10

0

21

10

16

21

0

55

7

13

16

18

-1.

106

43

11

4

20

8

0

76

22

12

1

5

4

0

670

290

102

45

81

61

1

As Table 4 shows, of the 290 investigations involving
second requests during the five year period, an estimated
102 were dropped by the agency, forty-five resulted in the
parties abandoning the acquisition (usually as the result of
expressed agency intent to challenge the transaction), 81
resulted in a fix-it-first restructuring implemented without
a court order, 61 resulted in a settlement reflected in a
court order subject to the Tunney Act, and one was
litigated.
Table 5 shows the relative percentage of these cases in
which minimally adequate disclosure was made. The table
includes under the category of inadequate disclosure the
following dispositions: (1) when the Antitrust Division
drops a merger investigation; (2) when the parties to a
proposed acquisition abandon the transaction, often in the
face 'of expressed agency opposition; and (3) when the
Department resolves competition issues through a fix-itfirst settlement that requires the merging parties to
restructure before proceeding with the merger. In most of
these cases, the Department offers no adequate public
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explanation of its enforcement decision and analysis. One
reason that the Justice Department provides minimally
adequate disclosure in such a small percentage of cases is
that, unlike the FTC, the Department resolves a high
percentage of cases through its "fix-it-first" settlements
with either perfunctory or no disclosure. In some of the fix
it first resolutions and in a few cases in which the parties
abandon a proposed merger, the Department issues a press
release announcing this result. Thus, during the four fiscal
year period 1998-2001, the Department reports issuing
press releases in sixty-six premerger investigations in
which the parties either abandoned the transaction or
agreed to restructure before consummating the acquisition.7 ' This figure represents 55% of the 120 premerger
cases resolved in this manner during the four year period.
As described in Part IV.B. below, the press releases tend to
be summary and do not provide adequate disclosure of the
facts and underlying analysis employed by the agency.
During the five fiscal year period (1998-2002), Table 5
shows that 79% of all dispositions of significant merger
investigations occurred under conditions of inadequate or
no disclosure. The category of minimally adequate
disclosure includes cases in which there was a Tunney Act
consent decree entered or cases that were litigated in a
preliminary injunction proceeding. Almost all of the cases
in which the Department's disclosure was minimally
adequate (sixty-one of the sixty-two investigations in this
category) were Tunney Act consent settlements. As
described in Part IV.C. below, Tunney Act resolutions
result in substantial disclosure, but the information
provided may be deficient in critical respects.

76. This data is gathered from Hart Scott Rodino Reports for Fiscal Years
1998-2001, available at http://ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrinfopub.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2003).
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Table 5
Antitrust Division Merger Enforcement Transparency
FY 1998 - FY 2002
FY 1998

FY 2000

FY 1999

FY 2001

FY2002

39

]

Inadequate Disclosure: Investigation Dropped or Transaction Abandoned or Restructured
Minimal Disclosure: Tunney Act Resolution or Litigated

The Antitrust Division has, in addition to its
investigations of pending mergers under the HSR Act, a
considerable number of non-HSR merger investigations.
Most of these investigations apparently involve acquisitions
that fell outside the Hart-Scott-Rodino
reporting
thresholds. During the five fiscal years 1998-2002, the
Division reports 217 non-HSR merger investigations. In 50
of these cases, the Division issued a civil investigative
demand, an indication of the substantiality of these
investigations.77 The available Division data does not reveal
in what percentage of these 50 cases the Division took some
formal enforcement action as the result of its investigation,
but it seems likely that transparency deficiencies are
comparable to those for HSR investigations.
The picture for non-merger civil enforcement at the
Antitrust Division looks somewhat different, but the issues
in terms of transparency are very much the same. Nonmerger civil enforcement, measured by the number of
investigations and cases filed, appears to occupy a small
77. This data is from the Antitrust Division's workload statistics.
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percentage of the Division's resources. These figures may be
somewhat misleading when, as in the case of the Microsoft
litigation, a single investigation and the ensuing litigation
occupy a major chunk of the agency's resources. What is
clear is that only a very small percentage of these
investigations result in public disclosure of the Division's
analysis.
Table 6
Non-,Merger Civil Enforcement
Antitrust Division
FY 1998 - FY 2002

FY 1998
FY1999
FY 2000
FY 2001
FY 2002
Totals

Initiated Cases
94
56
40
30
27

Filed Cases
5
7
2
0
3

157

17

As Table 6 indicates, during the five fiscal year period
1998-2002, the Department initiated 157 civil non-merger
investigations but filed only 17 cases. These filed cases,
whether settled by consent or litigated to judgment, are
likely to have produced at least minimum disclosure of the
underlying facts and analysis. But the 17 cases represent
only 10% of the investigations that the Department
initiated during this period. A significant chunk of the
investigations may not have involved substantial issues and
would not have produced meaningful disclosure because of
the routine nature of the issues. One must assume,
however, that many of these investigations did raise
substantial competition issues, and that the Division's
analysis of these issues would have offered meaningful
guidance to outsiders interested in the Division's
enforcement policies. Yet, as in the merger area, there is no
systematic and meaningful disclosure of such information
when the Department closes a resource-intensive
investigation.
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4. Justice Department Antitrust Criminal Enforcement
Transparency. The Antitrust Division commits substantial
resources to criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws.
During the five fiscal year period 1998-2002, the Division
reports filing 259 criminal cases, or an average of 52 each
year. 8 Criminal matters warrant separate treatment for at
least two reasons: (1) special confidentiality needs underlie
the use of criminal investigations and grand juries; and (2)
criminal enforcement involves per se violations of the
Sherman Act as to which, at least in theory, there is less
ambiguity in the law.
A premature public announcement that a criminal
investigation is underway may have various undesirable
consequences. For example, it may cast unwarranted
shadows on the reputation of a firm that is subject to the
investigation and it may complicate the gathering of
evidence by giving warning to the investigation targets.
After an indictment, the investigation is no longer a secret,
but the Division may continue to probe related criminal
activity involving other conduct, or other firms or
individuals.
The Antitrust Division's criminal enforcement has been
largely restricted to cartel activity such as bid rigging or
other forms of price fixing. Because this conduct is per se
unlawful under the Sherman Act, there may be less
ambiguity in the law. Counselors should have less difficulty
in providing legal advice about the illegality of such
conduct.
Even with respect to criminal enforcement, however,
the benefits of transparency are strong. There is a need,
just as in civil investigations, to provide timely information
concerning the investigation of a publicly traded firm so
that leaked information does not foster unfair trading in
the firm's stock. Although counselors may have relatively
little difficulty in determining that certain types of conduct
are per se unlawful, the power to deter such conduct rests
not only in its clear illegality but also in the likelihood of
substantial punishment. The Antitrust Division has in
recent years sought to publish its cartel enforcement
78. See Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Workload Statistics FY
1993-2002, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/12848.htm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2003). See generally Status Report: A Summary Overview of the
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program (Jan. 23, 2003), available
at http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/12576.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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successes and the large fines and imprisonment levied upon
defendants. For example, after criminal penalties had been
levied against participants in the lysine cartel, the Division
released video tapes and transcripts of cartel meetings as a
part of an effort to educate the business public about the
risks of cartel conduct. 79 The Division has also periodically
updated press releases which provide a list of the largest
criminal fines levied against cartel participants."0
Division disclosure has, however, been uneven and less
systematic than some might hope. For example, the largest
criminal fines ever levied were against firms involved in the
vitamin cartel, yet relatively little information was made
available about this cartel conduct (in contrast to the lysine
cartel where the Division provided much more background).81 Most of these criminal cartel cases are settled. As
in civil enforcement, the disclosure that accompanies a
settlement is generally far less extensive than the
information that would be provided in a litigated court
judgement. When the Division has reached a settlement
with all likely defendants involved in cartel conduct, the
Division should make a disclosure that is comparable to
that offered in civil enforcement settlements, including
identification of the markets at issue, the nature of the
alleged unlawful conduct, the degree of commerce involved,
and the reasons for accepting the negotiated settlement.
Near-miss issues that were resolved in favor of the
defendants should also be identified. The Division should
not, however, be forced to take a position on conduct the
lawfulness of which it did not clearly resolve.

79. The tapes were informally released by the Division as a part of a public
education effort that included speeches by Division officials describing various
cartels and how the Division investigated and prosecuted them. An example is a
speech by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Gary R. Spratling, The Trend
Towards Higher Corporate Fines: It's a Whole New Ball Game (Mar. 7, 1997)
(describing the lysine cartel and how criminal fines were calculated), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4011.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2003).
80. An example is the list, as of Jan. 23, 2003, of criminal fines in excess of
$10 million, available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/12557.htm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2003).
81. See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE OUR
ENEMY (2001) (providing an in-depth description of the lysine, citric acid, and
vitamin cartels).
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III. SELECTED CASE STUDIES IN ENFORCEMENT
TRANSPARENCY

In this section, I examine some of the details of
disclosure offered (or not offered) in specific law
enforcement decisions by the two agencies.
A. Cases Dropped After an Investigation
Most investigations initiated by either enforcement
agency are terminated without further enforcement action.
This is certainly true with respect to premerger clearance
under the HSR Act, where in fiscal year 2001 roughly 97%
of reported transactions were cleared routinely and without
a second request for information. Statistical data on the
number of cleared transactions is useful and is made
available by the agencies.82 Detailed information about such
clearances should not be required because of their limited
guidance value. But terminated investigations are likely to
have guidance value if the issues were carefully examined
by the agency and produced an agency decision on the
merits. Even if an agency finds a proposed merger
objectionable, the agency will drop its investigation if the
parties abandon the transaction. Beyond a notice that the
agency has cleared these transactions or that the parties
have abandoned the proposed merger, there is typically no
disclosure of the agency's analysis. Below, three examples
of the disclosure offered in terminated merger
investigations are examined: one by the Antitrust Division
and two by the FTC.
1. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX (AntitrustDivision 1997). The
Department of Justice investigated the proposed acquisition
of NYNEX by Bell Atlantic in 1997-98. This was a
combination of two large regional telephone companies that
provided local telephone service in adjacent regions of the
82. See Annual Hart Scott Rodino Reports, supra note 76.
83. Occasionally, the Antitrust Division does issue a press release to mark a
decision to close a merger investigation. Examples include the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX investigation discussed below and the two sentence press
release announcing that the Department would not challenge the merger of
Comcast and AT&T Broadband. Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,
Press Release, Nov. 13, 2002, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/
November/02 at 671.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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East Coast. NYNEX controlled local telephone service in
New York and New England while Bell Atlantic operated in
Atlantic states from New Jersey southward to Virginia.
Although not actual competitors in providing local service,
the two firms were viewed as potential competitors. For
example, Bell Atlantic's operations in Northern New Jersey
were thought to provide a ready stepping stone for entry
into the greater New York City market.
This was not a case of the agency abandoning its
investigation before it had reached a conclusion. The
Justice Department, after investigating this acquisition for
almost a year, issued a two sentence press release
announcing that the investigation had been dropped
because the merger did not violate the antitrust laws.84
Whether or not the Department's conclusion was the correct
one, some analysis of the Department's reasons for reaching
this conclusion would have been in order. Another agency
with concurrent jurisdiction over this acquisition, the
Federal Communications Commission, concluded that this
same transaction, in the absence of conditions requiring
additional commitments from the firms, would have
violated the standards of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
FCC issued an extensive opinion explaining its analysis of
the potential competition issue."
The contrast between the FCC's detailed, fact-based
analysis and the void in Justice Department disclosure is
highlighted because the two reviewers reached decisions
that potentially conflict. One might reconcile the results
based upon the FCC's application of a broad public interest
standard, but the FCC's analysis was based on competitive
effects under the same Merger Guidelines that the Justice
Department applies to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Whether or not the conflict was real, oversight and review
of the handling of this important merger would have been
enhanced by Justice Department disclosure. As it was, post-

84. Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 24, 1997 ("The Division has
decided that it will not challenge the transaction, having concluced that the
merger does not violate the antitrust laws."), availableat http://usdoj.gov/atr/
public/press-releases/1997/173at.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
85. See NYNEX Corp., F.C.C. 97-286 (Aug. 14, 1997).
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merger scholarship had to rely on the facts and analysis
provided by the FCC.86
2. Cruise Mergers (FTC 2002). The Federal Trade
Commission, like the Justice Department, does not
routinely issue statements explaining a decision to drop an
investigation. The Commmission, however, has offered
some disclosure in dropped investigations, particularly
when
there is disagreement among the five commission87
ers.

When the FTC dropped the cruise mergers
investigation in October of 2002, the Commission issued a
statement (signed by three commissioners) along with a
dissenting statement (signed by two commissioners).8 The
Commission's statement was short, but structured and
comprehensive in addressing most of the major issues that
had been raised during an investigation that lasted the
better part of a year. The opinion explained the proposed
transactions, analyzed the relevant market and an
alternative market definition considered and rejected by the
Commission, and assessed some of the possible anticompetitive impacts that might occur in that market.
Although this unusual effort to provide a more comprehensive statement was inadequate in some respects, the
86. See, e.g., Steven R. Brenner, Potential Competition in Local Telephone
Service: Bell Atlantic-NYNEX (1997), in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 116 (Kwoka & White eds., 1999).
87. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
88. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd/P&O Princess Cruises plc & Carnival Corporation/P&O
Princess Cruises plc., F.T.C. File No. 021 0041 (Oct. 4, 2002), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os2002/10/cruisestatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
The Commission's statements were supplemented by material released by the
directors of the Bureaus of Competition and Economics. Joseph J. Simons,
Director, Bureau of Competition, Merger Enforcement at the FTC, Remarks to
the Tenth Annual Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Institute
(Oct. 24, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/021024merge
enforcement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003); Bureau of Economics, FTC,
Cruise Investigation: Empirical Economic and Factual analysis (Nov. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/hilites/ftcbeababrownbag.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2003).
89. See Warren S. Grimes & John E. Kwoka, A Study in Merger
Enforcement Transparency: The FTC's Ocean Cruise Decision and the
Presumption Governing High Concentration Mergers, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE
(May 2003), available at http://www.antitrustsource.com (last visited Sept. 20,
2003).
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cruise merger statements still stand as- a template for
disclosure for an important terminated merger investigation. It would appear, however, that the Commission
regards the Cruise Mergers statements as necessary only
because of the unusual complexity of the issues involved in
that investigation. 9° Although the FTC Chairman has
publicly lauded the Cruise Mergers statement as a
constructive disclosure,91 the Commission has since made
clear that it does not intend to issue similar statements
when other major investigations are terminated. 92
3. General Mills Acquisition of Pillsbury (FTC 2001).
Another example of FTC disclosure of its reasons to
terminate an investigation was its October 2001 decision to
allow an acquisition of the Pillsbury Co. by General Mills,
Inc. The FTC's decision to drop the investigation was a
default result sought by none of the four voting
commissioners. Two of the commissioners supported a
proposed consent agreement offered by the merging parties,
under which General Mills would have divested a plant and
certain rights to the "Doughboy" trademark to a third party.
The remaining two commissioners believed this remedy
inadequate to protect the public and favored seeking a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the transaction. Neither
pair of Commissioners was willing to support the other
side's favored resolution, and the parties were allowed to
consummate the acquisition without any FTC action.
Commissioners Swindle and Leary, who favored
accepting the parties proposed consent agreement, filed an
opinion indicating that General Mills would honor the
90. FTC Cruise Mergers Statement, supra note 88.
91. Chairman Muris states:
On several occasions in the past year, the Commission has issued
statements explaining why it declined to take actions involving
mergers for which the agency had issued a second request or otherwise
conducted a significant inquiry. By doing so, the agency has sought to
provide greater transparency concerning our analysis of mergers.
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Looking Forward:
The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S.
Competition Policy, Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review (Dec. 10, 2002),
available
at
http://www.abcny.org/calendar/2002_12/event_1210.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
92. See FTC Response to AAI Comments in Wal-mart Stores,
Inc./Supermercados Amigo (providing a link to the FTC responses to commenting parties), available at http://ftc.gov.opa/2003/02/fyi0315.htm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2003).
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terms of the proposed consent even without its formal
acceptance by the Commission. " In their separate opinions
urging that a preliminary injunction be sought,
Commissioners Thompson and Anthony argued that these
remedies were inadequate, citing the difficulty of bifurcated
ownership of a single trademark and the FTC's negative
experience with remedies that involved divestiture of
something less than an ongoing business.94
The opinions, none of which was more than a page and
a half in length, framed the remedial issue in broad terms,
but failed to provide a systematic analysis of the markets
involved and the anticompetitive risks that were to be
addressed by the proposed trademark remedies. The
General Mills/Pillsbury statements are probably typical of
the statements issued by one or more commissioners in the
face of a disagreement. Usually these statements broadly
frame the issue that was the focus of disagreement, but
ignore or treat superficially other competitive issues that
were raised during the investigation. The adequacy of a
particular remedy is best judged in light of the seriousness
of the anticompetitive threats raised by an acquisition such
as General Mills/Pillsbury. Yet none of the opinions provide
nearly enough factual background for an outsider to
intelligently assess these threats. Commissioner Thompson,
for example, indicates that the merger "would drastically
increase concentration in the already concentrated markets
for cake mixes, ready-to-spread frosting, family flour, cookie
mixes, brownie mixes, quick bread mixes, pancake mixes,
and potato mixes." Commissioners Swindle and Leary state
that for the markets in question, the acquisition would
reduce the number of significant competitors "from three to
two or two to one," but fail to identify which markets they
were describing. Indeed, none of the opinions describe the
participants in these markets (other than General Mills or
Pillsbury), provide any premerger or postmerger market
shares or Herfindahl numbers, detail the history of entry,
or provide any perspective on the premerger competitive
behavior of the major market participants.

93. Statement of Commissioners Orson Swindle and Thomas B. Leary,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO1/1O/gmstmtswinleary.htm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2003).
94. Statements of Mozelle W. Thompson and Sheila F. Anthony, availableat
http:www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/gmstmtant.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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The bifurcated trademark ownership that was part of
the failed consent (but which General Mills said it would
implement even in the absence of the consent order) seems
tailor-made for future disputes that could come before the
Commission or some other tribunal. Had the FTC at least
offered a fuller statement of the competitive conditions and
concerns addressed at the time of the acquisition, this could
have provided a foundation for future adjudication of
competitive abuses. In the face of the genuine disagreement
among the commissioners over the appropriate remedy,
post-decision oversight of the adequacy of the remedy would
also have been useful. The absence of meaningful disclosure
hampers the achievement of either of these goals.
B. Justice DepartmentFix-It-FirstResolutions of Merger
Investigations
When the Justice Department resolves anticompetitive
issues in a pending merger through a negotiated
restructuring, it often does so on the condition that the
merging parties effect the restructuring before the merger
is consummated. There is much to commend the fix-it-first
program-it substantially lessens the need for post merger
scrutiny because the needed restructuring has supposedly
been effected. There is no occasion to file a district court
claim with its attendant costs. The implications for
transparency are, however, less positive. The Department
sometimes issues a press release to announce the
restructuring; on other occasions, there is no press release.
An example of a fix-it-first case in which the Division
did issue a press release is the September 2002
announcement that Wakefield Materials Co. would be
required to divest a ready-mix concrete facility serving
northern metropolitan Boston as condition for an
acquisition of Wakefield by Aggregate Industries plc.95 The
press release identifies northern metropolitan Boston as a
key geographic market in which competition in the readymix market would have been affected (the proposed
acquisition "would have reduced the number of ready-mix
concrete suppliers able to service large construction projects
95. See Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Press Release (Sept. 6,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/02 at_515.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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in densely populated northern metropolitan Boston from
three to two"). It is quite possible that this one-plant
divestiture resolved the only serious threat to competition
posed by this acquisition. But there is a hint in the press
release that at least one other geographic market was at
issue. The release indicates that Wakefield, in an
agreement with the Attorney General of Massachusetts,
would relinquish a lease it held on a ready-mix plant in
Worcester, Massachusetts, located approximately sixty
miles West (and slightly south) of Boston. No information
was provided on the competitive conditions that lay behind
this agreement, nor on any other markets in which
Wakefield and Aggregate Industries might have competed
before the merger.
The Wakefield/Aggregate Press Release, like most
disclosures by either agency, fails to discuss any "nearmiss" markets or issues. The public is informed only about
those markets or issues in which remedial action is taken.
No mention is made of areas that may have been investigated and determined to be of insufficient competitive
concern to consider relief. In many of the fix-it-first cases,
the Antitrust Division makes no disclosure at all, so that
the public has no knowledge of the parties to the
transaction, the markets that were deemed threatened, or
the nature of the restructuring relief that the parties
agreed to.96
The Antitrust Division's use of the fix-it-first remedy in
Wakefield and in the numerous other merger cases stands
in contrast to the FTC, where all settled cases involve entry
of an enforceable consent. In principle, the fix-it-first
approach is a clean and efficient way to resolve anticompetitive issues before the acquisition is consummated.
There are cases, however, when the post-acquisition
behavior on the merging parties would call for further
agency action. Suppose that the Department has required
the merging parties to spin off a plant to a rival firm as a
condition for proceeding with the acquisition. After the spin
off is accomplished, the merged firm undermines the
operation of the divested plant by seeking to lure away the
plant's valued employees and customers. Although there is
96. In the annual Hart Scott Rodino reports to the Congress, the Antitrust
Division may make known the names of the parties to these fix-it-first
agreements, but no further information is provided.
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no evidence that this has occurred or will occur in
connection with the Wakefield acquisition, the Antitrust
Division would lack an easily enforceable judicial order in
any case in which it had relied on the fix-it-first remedy.
The need for a judicially enforceable order is not
directly relevant to the transparency issue. There is,
however, the disquieting possibility that the burdens of
Tunney Act compliance
are fostering unintended
consequences. The Antitrust Division may be going out of
its way to avoid the burdens of Tunney Act compliance,
foregoing use of judicially enforceable orders even when it is
in the public interest to issue such an order. If there were
no significant added burdens to obtaining a judicially
enforceable consent, one might expect the Division to obtain
such a consent in every settled case (in accord with FTC
practice). This concern suggests the need to tailor any
transparency reform to minimize the burden on the
enforcement agency.
C. Cases Settled By Consent of the Parties
Looking at the universe of cases in which the Federal
agencies determine to bring an enforcement action, by far
the largest group of these cases are settled by consent of the
parties. The settlement is often reached before any
administrative or judicial complaint is filed. If the agency
wants to obtain sanctions for non-compliance, governing
procedures for both agencies still require that an
administrative (FTC) or judicial (DOJ) complaint be issued.
Of course, settlements also occur after litigation has been
initiated. Examples include the Justice Department's
settlement of the AT&T litigation in 1982 and of the
Microsoft case in 2001.
Below, two examples of consent resolutions are
examined, one each for the Antitrust Division and the FTC.
1. Archer Daniels Midland/MinnesotaCorn Processors.
In July of 2002, Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM) entered
into an agreement to acquire Minnesota Corn Processors,
LLC. (MCP). Both firms were prominent producers of corn
wet milled products, including corn syrup and two grades of
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS 42 and HFCS 55). The
markets before the acquisition were highly concentrated,
with five firms competing in the manufacture of these
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products in the U.S. and Canada. ADM was the largest
producer for some of these products, with 10% of all corn
syrup manufacturing capacity, 33% of all HFCS 42
capacity, and 25% of all HFCS 55 capacity. MCP sold these
products through a joint venture with another corn miller,
Corn Products International (CPI). MCP's market share
was not disclosed by the Antitrust Division, but its joint
venture with CPI was reported to have 20% of corn syrup
manufacturing capacity, and more than 15% each of the
capacity for HFCS 42 and HFCS 55.
In September of 2002, the Antitrust Division filed a
civil complaint challenging the acquisition and immediately
announced a consent settlement subject to Tunney Act
review. The complaint and competitive impact statement
indicated that the acquisition would reduce the number of
independent competitors from five to four and would result
in substantially higher concentration in the markets for
corn syrup, HFCS 42, and HFCS 55. The consent
agreement was said to "eliminate the anticompetitive
effects"97 by requiring the merged firm to dissolve the joint
venture between MCP and CPI and notify CPI of its right to
conduct independent operations in competition with the
merged firm. The termination of the joint venture would
ensure that "there are at least five independent competitors
in the corn syrup and HFCS markets, and will preserve and
encourage ongoing competition between ADM and CPI."98
The Tunney Act review process produced comments,
most prominently those filed by Professor Peter Carstensen
on behalf of himself, the National Farmers Union, the
Organization for Competitive Markets, and seven law or
economics professors (in addition to Professor Carstensen).
These comments faulted the Antitrust Division's disclosure
on a number of counts, among them that (1) the Division
failed to disclose the separate market shares of MCP and
CPI in any of the relevant markets identified; (2) the
Division made no mention of ADM's direct and indirect
ownership of Tate & Lyle PLC, the corporate parent of A.E.
Staley Manufacturing Co., a direct rival in the production
and sale of products within the relevant markets; and (3)
the Division failed to disclose any information about
97. U.S. Department of Justice, Competitve Impact Statement, United
States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Sept. 13, 2002, availableat http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fll900/ll901.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
98. Id.
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possible anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the
market for ethanol.
The disclosure that the Antitrust Division makes in
consent cases tends to be more comprehensive than any
disclosure that the Division might make in fix-it-first
resolutions
or
investigations
that
are
closed
unconditionally. Yet, as the ADM case illustrates, the
Division's disclosure is often inadequate for meaningful
oversight of its actions. Thus, the failure to provide the
market shares of two key participants in the relevant
markets, MCP and CPI, made difficult any meaningful
assessment of the adequacy of the consent relief. The
Division claimed that its relief (requiring dissolution of the
joint marketing venture between MCP and CPI) would
ensure that the same number of independent competitors
(five) would remain in the market after consummation of
the merger. But it seemed likely that the combination of
ADM and MCP would increase the market share of the
largest participant in these markets, with the result that
the post merger HHI would be higher than the premerger
HHI.99 The increased opportunity for anticompetitive
strategic behavior by a larger number one firm ought to be
a serious issue in any combination of this sort, yet this issue
was not mentioned in the Division's analysis.
The Carstensen comments also highlight the Division's
failure to address issues that could be of substantial
competitive effect, yet were not even mentioned in the
Division's initial Competitive Impact Statement. The first is
the impact of ADM's indirect ownership of a significant
interest (approximately 16%) of a direct rival (A.E. Staley)
in the markets that are at issue in this acquisition. The
second is the impact of the acquisition on the ethanol
market. The Division has now addressed these issues in its
response to the Tunney Act comments, and Professor
Carstensen has replied in a letter to the Court.1"'

99. According to a letter from Prof. Carstensen to the Court, the Antitrust
Division has now acknowledged that this acquisition, even with the dissolution
of the joint venture, "will increase concentration in the HFCS 42 market by 300
HHI points to 3300 and in the HFCS 55 market by 100 HHI points from 2500 to
2600." Carstensen Letter to the Honorable John Bates, U.S. District Court for
the District of Colombia, Apr. 17, 2003, available at http://www.competitive
markets.com/whatsnew/2003/4-17.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
100. Id.
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The response suggests that the Antitrust Division did
consider at least some of these issues, but deemed any
potentially stronger remedy that might be achieved not
worth the cost and risk of litigating. Whether the Division
has made a sound policy decision in agreeing to the consent
resolution is beyond the scope of this paper. The inadequacy
of the Division's disclosure, however, is very evident in this
case. The intervention (through his Tunney Act comments)
of Prof. Carstensen has forced into the public domain
additional serious issues that were not revealed in the
Antitrust Division's competitive impact statement. This
seems the reverse of the how the process should work: the
Division's initial disclosure should raise these issues in the
first instance, not wait for outsiders' comments to compel
the Division to address them. The Tunney Act envisions a
full disclosure of matters relevant to a competitive
assessment of the consent settlement."' The Department's
disclosure in ADM was not within the letter and spirit of
the Tunney Act's requirements.
2. Wal-Mart/Supermercados Amigo. In February of
2002, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. signed an agreement to
purchase the outstanding voting shares of Supermercados
Amigo, Inc. Walmart is a global food and general
merchandise retailer that, through a subsidiary, owns and
operates in Puerto Rico nine traditional Wal-Mart stores,
one Wal-Mart superstore, and eight SAM's Clubs. Amigo
was the largest supermarket chain in Puerto Rico. After an
investigation that lasted the better part of a year, the FTC
announced in November of 2002 that it accepted a consent
order from the parties that would require divestiture of four
Amigo supermarkets. Under the Commission's rules, the
proposed order was open for public comment for thirty days.
In its analysis published simultaneously with its
complaint, the Commission defined a relevant market that
included not only supermarkets, but also supercenters and
101. The Competitive Impact Statement made no mention that the
settlement would significantly increase concentration in at least two of the key
markets, an omission that would make a travesty of the Tunney Act's
requirement of a meaningful competitive analysis. See Section 5(b) of the
Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. §16(b)(3)(2000) (requiring that the "competitive impact
statement" include "an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment,
including an explanation of... relief to be obtained thereby, and the
anticipated effects on competition of such relief ....
").
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club stores of the type that Walmart operates. This market
definition, a departure from that the Commission has used
in past supermarket mergers, was explained with some
detail in the Commission's analysis.'
The Commission
found that many Puerto Rican consumers considered the
three types of stores as interchangeable when seeking a
food retailer. Although broader market definitions, by
diluting market shares, usually work in the favor of the
merging parties, in this instance, the broader market
definition made it easier for the Commission to challenge a
supermarket chain acquisition by a firm that did not
operate supermarkets in Puerto Rico. The Commission's
statement was also forthcoming in providing HHI data,
both pre- and post-merger, for the three local markets in
which it was ordering divestitures.
Despite the relatively full picture painted by the FTC's
analysis, it failed to address any of the near-miss issues.
For example, there was no significant discussion of other
local markets in which the merger might have substantially
raised concentration, no discussion of potential competition
issues (Was Walmart a likely entrant in various local
Puerto Rican markets?), and no discussion of the strategic
conduct issues that might be raised by allowing Walmart to
acquire the largest supermarket chain on the island. In
particular, the analysis did not discuss the likely buying
power that would be wielded by the merged firm in Puerto
Rico, an issue that was raised in a number of public
comments.
The Commission responded to these concerns in
publicly released letters addressed to each of the parties
filing comments. °3 FTC Rules, unlike the Tunney Act, do
not require a published response to comments received by
the agency. The FTC's decision to publish the letters sent to
commenting persons is a laudable and important step
toward needed transparency. These responses, along with
its initial analysis released when the consent was
announced, provide a fairly full picture of its competitive
analysis of the proposed merger. The FTC's response as to
102. The adequacy of this explanation was questioned in a letter from
Albert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute, to Donald Clark,
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 20, 2002) (on file with author).
103. The Commission's February 2003 press release announcing final
approval of the consent is available at http://ftc.gov.http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003
/02/fyi0315.htm (providing a link to the FTC responses to commenting parties).
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"near-miss" geographic markets was perfunctory and not
helpful. In other areas, however, the Commission provided
a more complete picture of its reasoning, explaining its
position on buying power issues as well as potential
competition. Many may disagree with the Commission's
analysis on these points.1 4 Without disclosure of its
reasoning, there would be no opportunity to disagree. The
benefits of disclosure include the ability to understand the
agency position and, if one disagrees, to join an open debate
that may shape future public policy.
The primary shortcoming of the FTC's disclosure in
Walmart lies in its failure to address "near-miss" issues, a
defect that was partially remedied only after public
comments pressured the agency to address these issues.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the key issues in designing a transparency policy
is its overall impact on antitrust law and policy. The
Sherman Antitrust Act is now well into its second century.
The Act's history is replete with examples of apparently
contradictory Supreme Court precedents and chameleonlike shifts in agency enforcement policy. What is
remarkable about the last forty years of this history is that
the shifts have occurred within relatively narrow
constraints. Leaving out the area of vertical restraints
where legal and economic theory seem less settled,
antitrust has become more deserving of the accolade that it
is a system of laws, not of men. There is a substantial area
of consensus and a tradition that gives policy makers more
guidance and, perhaps, greater security that whatever
enforcement decisions they make, competition and the
system of antitrust enforcement will survive. Would greater
transparency
undermine
these
achievements
by
"politicizing" enforcement decisions?
104. The FTC offered a view of unlawful monopsony power that would be
confined to cases involving a monopsonist's ability to lower purchase price and
restrict output by suppliers. This view may rest on a sound reading of the
theoretical economics underlying monopsony, but it hardly exhausts the
coverage of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As demonstrated by cases such as
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc),
monopoly abuses (and by analogy also monopsony abuses) include the use of a
dominant or near-dominant firm's market power to gain strategic advantage,
such as by raising a rival's cost to compete.
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Antitrust has always been, and will always be,
political-both in the positive and more pejorative senses of
that word. Debate and genuine disagreement is a healthy
manifestation of a vibrant and evolving antitrust policy-in
this sense the political debate surrounding antitrust is
positive. Antitrust enforcement must always be conducted
with an eye for its political constituency-and to avoid
creating major political issues for its opponents. That may
lead to some expedient and short-sighted enforcement
decisions, but a pragmatic awareness of politics is necessary
for survival. At the same time, because antitrust
enforcement directly affects business profits, the more
tawdry aspects of influence buying and conflicts of interest
are also known to antitrust. In this sense, the political side
of antitrust is a negative.
Antitrust is an evolving system of laws that must live
within a complex political system that itself must respond
to a changing world. The case for transparency is not that it
will be a panacea for all that ails antitrust or the system of
competition that antitrust supports. Short-sighted and
expedient enforcement decisions will continue to be made.
Political influence, often subtle and indirect, will still be a
factor. But transparency can support meaningful and
timely debate about the cutting edge issues of competition
that actually confront contemporary antitrust enforcers.
And it can cast sunlight on decisions in a way that can
discourage expedient, careless or unprincipled decisions.
Transparency will more effectively communicate the law to
those who wish to comply with it. Yes, it might in some
instances more readily show a path for those who would
evade the law, but evasions too may more readily come to
light and be remedied if there is openness in enforcement.
These are concepts subtle in measurement if not in
description. Yet the case for greater openness seems
compelling. This is so, in part, because transparency is
consistent with fundamental and deeply held values that
support a responsive, fair and democratic government.
Achieving transparency reform will be difficult. There
are well-meaning and experienced antitrust enforcers who
have genuine reservations about moving away from the
law-enforcement model of antitrust that has become central
to the culture of the Antitrust Division. They have nontrivial concerns about the burdens of greater transparency
and a system of voluntary submissions that rests on
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maintaining the confidentiality of business information.
The truth is, however, that in this age of internet
communications, antitrust has already moved well beyond
the classic model of law-enforcement as a secret process in
which the government enforcer alone knows the critical
facts. The Federal Trade Commission has demonstrated
that antitrust enforcement can be effectively carried out in
a more open environment. In a much more emphatic way,
so too has the European Commission.
That more openness is needed, then, is not likely to be
the point of contention. The critical questions will be how
much, how soon, and how to achieve it at the lowest cost to
other enforcement values. The goal of transparency reform
should be to achieve adequate public disclosure of all
agency enforcement decisions likely to have significant
guidance value within or outside the agency. To achieve
this goal, substantial change in current disclosure policy
will be required. This will require a firm commitment at
each agency's highest level. Here are some specific steps
that would achieve this goal.
(1) Web sites need to be updated to provide more
accessible and complete information. For each enforcement
category, the sites should provide multiple indexes of
decisions, including listings broken down by date of
decision, names of the parties, and subjects addressed in
each decision. Subject indexes should be coordinated
between the agencies so that each agency's web site can
contain meaningful cross-references to the other's site. For
example, a subject index for health care advisory opinions
(FTC) or business review letters (Antitrust Division) should
include coordinated topic headings that a site visitor can
use to obtain seamless access to decisions of the other
agency.
(2) For all publicly traded firms, each agency should
promptly and effectively disclose each critical stage of a
civil enforcement investigation, thereby minimizing
concerns that leaked information is the basis for unfair
trading in the firm's stock. For criminal investigations, the
Antitrust Division should reexamine its disclosure practices
to provide the maximum disclosure consistent with
enforcement needs and to ensure that leaked information
does not become a basis for unfair stock trading.
(3) Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division should
consider making more efficient use of their web sites to
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provide information about pending merger investigations.
Announcements of pending mergers should be organized
into a separate sublisting within the site. The prompt web
postings of reported mergers used by other federal agencies
such as the Federal Reserve, and by the European Union
and Germany's Bundeskartellamt, would seem an excellent
way to reduce costs in disseminating information and to
invite interested outsiders to provide comments about
pending mergers. Statutory authorization may be required
for some of these changes. Because there may be initial
doubt about which federal agency will be assigned to review
a merger transaction, the agencies should coordinate these
initial postings, perhaps designating responsibility for this
task to a single agency. At a minimum, the disclosure
should include a description of the parties and the proposed
transaction and information concerning the market or
markets in which the firms are active.
(4) For all merger transactions for which the agency
reaches a decision on the merits of a Clayton Act Section 7
claim, the agency should provide more detailed disclosure if
the acquisition involved the issuance of a second request or
was subject to an extended investigation. The FTC's cruise
merger opinion is a template for such an expanded
explanation, which should include a description of any
relevant market; information concerning the degree of
premerger and postmerger concentration in each relevant
market, including market share data for the participants
and industry-wide data (HHI numbers); a description of all
major competitive issues considered by the agency or raised
by outside parties and an explanation of why the agency did
or did not find these competitive issues determinative; a full
description of the remedy, if any, that the agency would
obtain in settlement of the case; and a description of
alternative remedies, if any, that might have been available
and an explanation of why the agency did not opt for these
alternatives.
(5) The agencies should provide more complete
disclosure in settled cases, including identification of near
miss issues and whether or not they were resolved in the
target firm's favor and description of alternative remedies
considered but not adopted by the agency. The Tunney Act
would appear to require this disclosure in cases settled by
the Antitrust Division, but this disclosure should become
standard practice for both agencies in any settled case,
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regardless of whether the Tunney Act applies. This
disclosure should also apply to criminal cases at the point
at which the Division has resolved its investigation with all
of the targets of its criminal inquiry.
(6) Reform should also be directed to eliminating
unnecessary costs to the current transparency scheme. In
particular, the Tunney Act should be amended to eliminate
any requirement of publication in newspapers. The HSR
Act should be amended to make clear that the agency has
authority to release information from a premerger filing
when that information is needed to explain an agency
decision. In addition, with the ready availability of record
evidence on the agencies' web sites, it may no longer be
necessary to incur the expense and delay of publishing
certain materials in the Federal Register. Unnecessary
burdens in any transparency scheme should be eliminated
lest they create internal incentives against disclosure and
undermine the overall goal of attaining meaningful
transparency.
Most of these steps will not involve substantial costs to
the agency. Improving the accessibility of information
already made available will require updating and
expanding each agency's web site, but once the improved
site is operational, the additional costs of improved
accessibility should not be substantial. Additional costs will
be incurred in order to issue more detailed explanations at
the conclusion of a major investigation. These statements
would not be required in a large number of cases, but will
require nontrivial commitments by the agency. Internal
decision memoranda may be the basis for the agency's
public explanation, but such memoranda would have to be
carefully edited to assure no confidential material is
released. It is likely, however, that once agency disclosure
becomes routine, the process would become more efficient
and less resource intensive."'
105. One issue likely to arise is the extent to which the agency should
disclose market shares of the parties to the transaction. Market share data is
made available in litigated cases and, often, in cases settled by consent. As a
general rule, market shares should be released at the time the agency
announces any disposition of an investigation which is likely to have
precedential impact. This information can be valuable to anyone seeking to
understand current agency policy and to those who would critique and review
the agency's enforcement record. On the other hand, in some cases, release of
market share data could compromise business secrecy and confidential
information voluntarily provided to the agency. To the extent that these
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Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division probably have
the authority to issue explanatory statements without
further legislation. Indeed, both agencies already do so on
occasion. To the extent that additional legislation is
required to authorize such statements, or to the extent that
the agencies do not voluntarily provide these statements,
Congress should act to ensure that transparency is
achieved.
The matter of transparency is especially urgent with
respect to merger enforcement because the locus of law and
rulemaking power has shifted to the federal agencies, with
only sparse judicial review of agency decisions. The virtual
vacuum on explanations of decisions to drop substantial
merger enforcement investigations, or of agency concerns
underlying a decision of the merging parties to abandon the
transaction or restructure in a fix-it-first agreement, is
highly unsatisfactory.

constraints limit the release of market share data of individual firms, the
agency may still be in a position to release composite market share data, or
indicate a range within which the agency believes that individual market
shares fall.

